feat: 实现演示验证码和令牌轮换

.env.example

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
 # Copy this file to .env and replace test-only values for non-test environments.
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://drift:drift_test_only@127.0.0.1:55432/drift_bottle_test?schema=public
 REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:56379
+WEB_ORIGIN=http://localhost:3000
+PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=<base64-encoded-exactly-32-byte-key>
+PHONE_HMAC_KEY=<independent-at-least-32-byte-secret>
+VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY=<independent-at-least-32-byte-secret>
+REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY=<independent-at-least-32-byte-secret>
+JWT_SECRET=<at-least-32-byte-secret>
+JWT_ISSUER=drift-api
+JWT_AUDIENCE=drift-web
+ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS=900
+REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS=2592000
+SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS=300
+REDIS_KEY_PREFIX=drift:auth:
+TRUST_PROXY=false

.prettierignore

@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ dist
 coverage
 
 docs/
+pnpm-lock.yaml

apps/api/package.json

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "build": "tsc -p tsconfig.build.json",
     "start": "node dist/main.js",
     "test": "vitest run --config vitest.config.ts --no-file-parallelism",
-    "test:e2e": "vitest run --config vitest.config.ts src/health/health.e2e-spec.ts --no-file-parallelism",
+    "test:e2e": "vitest run --config vitest.config.ts src/health/health.e2e-spec.ts src/auth/auth.e2e-spec.ts --no-file-parallelism",
     "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit -p tsconfig.json"
   },
   "dependencies": {
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
     "@prisma/client": "6.19.0",
     "class-transformer": "^0.5.1",
     "class-validator": "^0.14.2",
+    "cookie": "1.1.1",
     "helmet": "^8.1.0",
     "redis": "^5.8.2",
     "reflect-metadata": "^0.2.2",

apps/api/src/app.module.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 import { MiddlewareConsumer, Module, type NestModule } from "@nestjs/common";
 import { RequestIdMiddleware } from "./common/request-id.middleware.js";
 import { HealthModule } from "./health/health.module.js";
+import { AuthModule } from "./auth/auth.module.js";
 
-@Module({ imports: [HealthModule] })
+@Module({ imports: [HealthModule, AuthModule] })
 export class AppModule implements NestModule {
   configure(consumer: MiddlewareConsumer): void {
     consumer.apply(RequestIdMiddleware).forRoutes("{*path}");

apps/api/src/auth/auth.config.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  codeHmac,
+  phoneHmac,
+  resetAuthEnvironmentForTests,
+  validateAuthEnvironment,
+} from "./auth.config.js";
+
+const valid = {
+  PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=",
+  PHONE_HMAC_KEY: "phone-hmac-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes",
+  VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY: "code-hmac-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes!",
+  REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY: "refresh-key-that-is-at-least-thirty-two-bytes",
+  JWT_SECRET: "jwt-secret-that-is-at-least-thirty-two-bytes",
+};
+
+describe("auth environment", () => {
+  const original = { ...process.env };
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+    Object.assign(process.env, valid);
+    resetAuthEnvironmentForTests();
+  });
+  afterEach(() => {
+    process.env = { ...original, NODE_ENV: "test" };
+    resetAuthEnvironmentForTests();
+  });
+
+  it.each(Object.keys(valid))("fails fast when %s is missing", (name) => {
+    delete process.env[name];
+    expect(() => validateAuthEnvironment()).toThrow(`${name} is required`);
+  });
+
+  it.each(Object.keys(valid))("fails fast when %s is too short", (name) => {
+    process.env[name] = "short";
+    expect(() => validateAuthEnvironment()).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it("rejects duplicate keys including the verification-code key", () => {
+    process.env.VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY = process.env.PHONE_HMAC_KEY;
+    expect(() => validateAuthEnvironment()).toThrow(
+      "Auth secrets must be independent",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("uses a verification-code key independent from the phone key", () => {
+    validateAuthEnvironment();
+    const phoneDigest = phoneHmac("+8613800138000");
+    const first = codeHmac(phoneDigest, "123456");
+    resetAuthEnvironmentForTests();
+    process.env.VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY =
+      "different-code-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes";
+    validateAuthEnvironment();
+    expect(phoneHmac("+8613800138000")).toBe(phoneDigest);
+    expect(codeHmac(phoneDigest, "123456")).not.toBe(first);
+  });
+});

apps/api/src/auth/auth.config.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+import {
+  createCipheriv,
+  createDecipheriv,
+  createHmac,
+  randomBytes,
+  timingSafeEqual,
+} from "node:crypto";
+
+function required(name: string, min = 32): Buffer {
+  const value = process.env[name];
+  if (!value) throw new Error(`${name} is required`);
+  const decoded =
+    name === "PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY"
+      ? Buffer.from(value, "base64")
+      : Buffer.from(value);
+  if (decoded.length < min)
+    throw new Error(`${name} must be at least ${min} bytes`);
+  return decoded;
+}
+const REQUIRED_KEYS = [
+  "PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY",
+  "PHONE_HMAC_KEY",
+  "VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY",
+  "REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY",
+  "JWT_SECRET",
+] as const;
+type AuthSecrets = Record<(typeof REQUIRED_KEYS)[number], Buffer>;
+let secrets: AuthSecrets | undefined;
+
+export function validateAuthEnvironment(): void {
+  const loaded = Object.fromEntries(
+    REQUIRED_KEYS.map((name) => [name, required(name)]),
+  ) as unknown as AuthSecrets;
+  if (loaded.PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.length !== 32)
+    throw new Error("PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY must decode to exactly 32 bytes");
+  const fingerprints = REQUIRED_KEYS.map((name) =>
+    loaded[name].toString("hex"),
+  );
+  if (new Set(fingerprints).size !== fingerprints.length)
+    throw new Error("Auth secrets must be independent");
+  secrets = loaded;
+}
+export function resetAuthEnvironmentForTests(): void {
+  if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test")
+    throw new Error("Auth environment reset is test-only");
+  secrets = undefined;
+}
+function authSecrets(): AuthSecrets {
+  if (!secrets) validateAuthEnvironment();
+  return secrets!;
+}
+export const jwtSecret = (): Buffer => authSecrets().JWT_SECRET;
+export const phoneHmac = (phone: string): string =>
+  createHmac("sha256", authSecrets().PHONE_HMAC_KEY)
+    .update(phone)
+    .digest("hex");
+export const codeHmac = (phoneDigest: string, code: string): string =>
+  createHmac("sha256", authSecrets().VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY)
+    .update(`${phoneDigest}:${code}`)
+    .digest("hex");
+export const refreshHmac = (token: string): string =>
+  createHmac("sha256", authSecrets().REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY)
+    .update(token)
+    .digest("hex");
+export const safeEqual = (a: string, b: string): boolean => {
+  const x = Buffer.from(a);
+  const y = Buffer.from(b);
+  return x.length === y.length && timingSafeEqual(x, y);
+};
+export function encryptPhone(phone: string): Buffer {
+  const key = authSecrets().PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  if (key.length !== 32)
+    throw new Error("PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY must decode to exactly 32 bytes");
+  const nonce = randomBytes(12);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, nonce);
+  const body = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(phone, "utf8"), cipher.final()]);
+  return Buffer.concat([nonce, cipher.getAuthTag(), body]);
+}
+export function decryptPhone(value: Buffer): string {
+  const key = authSecrets().PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY;
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, value.subarray(0, 12));
+  decipher.setAuthTag(value.subarray(12, 28));
+  return Buffer.concat([
+    decipher.update(value.subarray(28)),
+    decipher.final(),
+  ]).toString();
+}
+export const envInt = (name: string, fallback: number): number => {
+  const n = Number(process.env[name] ?? fallback);
+  return Number.isInteger(n) && n > 0 ? n : fallback;
+};

apps/api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+import {
+  Body,
+  Controller,
+  Get,
+  HttpCode,
+  HttpStatus,
+  Inject,
+  Post,
+  Req,
+  Res,
+  UseGuards,
+} from "@nestjs/common";
+import type { Request, Response } from "express";
+import { parse as parseCookie } from "cookie";
+import { ErrorCode } from "@drift/contracts";
+import { DomainException } from "../common/domain.exception.js";
+import { PrismaService } from "../database/prisma.service.js";
+import { AuthGuard } from "./auth.guard.js";
+import { AuthService, type TokenPair } from "./auth.service.js";
+import { CurrentUser } from "./current-user.decorator.js";
+import type { AccessClaims } from "./token.service.js";
+import { LoginDto, SendSmsDto } from "./dto.js";
+const COOKIE = "refresh_token";
+@Controller()
+export class AuthController {
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(AuthService) private readonly auth: AuthService,
+    @Inject(PrismaService) private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
+  ) {}
+  @Post("auth/sms/send") send(@Body() dto: SendSmsDto, @Req() req: Request) {
+    return this.auth.sendSms(dto.phone, dto.deviceId, this.ip(req));
+  }
+  @Post("auth/sms/login") async login(
+    @Body() dto: LoginDto,
+    @Req() req: Request,
+    @Res({ passthrough: true }) res: Response,
+  ) {
+    const pair = await this.auth.login(
+      dto.phone,
+      dto.code,
+      dto.deviceId,
+      this.ip(req),
+    );
+    this.cookie(res, pair.refreshToken);
+    return this.publicPair(pair);
+  }
+  @Post("auth/token/refresh") @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK) async refresh(
+    @Req() req: Request,
+    @Res({ passthrough: true }) res: Response,
+  ) {
+    this.origin(req);
+    const pair = await this.auth.refresh(this.readCookie(req));
+    this.cookie(res, pair.refreshToken);
+    return this.publicPair(pair);
+  }
+  @Post("auth/logout") @HttpCode(HttpStatus.OK) async logout(
+    @Req() req: Request,
+    @Res({ passthrough: true }) res: Response,
+  ) {
+    this.origin(req);
+    await this.auth.logout(this.readCookieOptional(req));
+    res.clearCookie(COOKIE, {
+      httpOnly: true,
+      sameSite: "strict",
+      secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
+      path: "/api/v1/auth",
+    });
+    return { loggedOut: true };
+  }
+  @Get("me") @UseGuards(AuthGuard) async me(@CurrentUser() user: AccessClaims) {
+    const account = await this.prisma.account.findUniqueOrThrow({
+      where: { id: user.sub },
+      include: { anonymousProfile: true },
+    });
+    return {
+      accountId: account.id,
+      publicId: account.anonymousProfile?.publicId ?? null,
+      nickname: account.anonymousProfile?.nickname ?? null,
+    };
+  }
+  private publicPair(pair: TokenPair) {
+    return {
+      accessToken: pair.accessToken,
+      expiresIn: pair.expiresIn,
+      tokenType: "Bearer",
+    };
+  }
+  private cookie(res: Response, value: string) {
+    res.cookie(COOKIE, value, {
+      httpOnly: true,
+      sameSite: "strict",
+      secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
+      path: "/api/v1/auth",
+      maxAge: Number(process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS ?? 2592000) * 1000,
+    });
+  }
+  private origin(req: Request) {
+    const origin = req.headers.origin;
+    if (origin !== process.env.WEB_ORIGIN)
+      throw new DomainException(
+        ErrorCode.AUTH_ORIGIN_FORBIDDEN,
+        "Forbidden origin",
+        HttpStatus.FORBIDDEN,
+      );
+  }
+  private readCookieOptional(req: Request) {
+    const raw = req.headers.cookie;
+    if (!raw) return undefined;
+    try {
+      return parseCookie(raw)[COOKIE];
+    } catch {
+      return undefined;
+    }
+  }
+  private readCookie(req: Request) {
+    const value = this.readCookieOptional(req);
+    if (!value)
+      throw new DomainException(
+        ErrorCode.AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS,
+        "Invalid credentials",
+        HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+      );
+    return value;
+  }
+  private ip(req: Request) {
+    return req.ip || req.socket.remoteAddress || "unknown";
+  }
+}
+
+Reflect.defineMetadata(
+  "design:paramtypes",
+  [SendSmsDto, Object],
+  AuthController.prototype,
+  "send",
+);
+Reflect.defineMetadata(
+  "design:paramtypes",
+  [LoginDto, Object, Object],
+  AuthController.prototype,
+  "login",
+);

apps/api/src/auth/auth.e2e-spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,499 @@
+/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-argument, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-member-access, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-call */
+import "reflect-metadata";
+import { Logger, type INestApplication } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { Test } from "@nestjs/testing";
+import { PrismaClient } from "@prisma/client";
+import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { createServer, type Socket } from "node:net";
+import { createClient } from "redis";
+import request from "supertest";
+import {
+  afterAll,
+  beforeAll,
+  beforeEach,
+  describe,
+  expect,
+  it,
+  vi,
+} from "vitest";
+import { assertSafeTestDatabaseUrl } from "../../../../prisma/database-safety.js";
+import { AppModule } from "../app.module.js";
+import { configureApp } from "../main.js";
+import { RedisService } from "../redis/redis.service.js";
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+process.env.WEB_ORIGIN = "http://localhost:3000";
+process.env.PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY =
+  "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
+process.env.PHONE_HMAC_KEY = "test-phone-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
+process.env.VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY =
+  "test-code-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-with-at-least-thirty-two-bytes";
+process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY =
+  "test-refresh-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
+process.env.REDIS_KEY_PREFIX = "drift:auth:e2e:";
+const phone = "138 0013 8000",
+  deviceId = "device-test-001",
+  origin = "http://localhost:3000";
+const prisma = new PrismaClient();
+const redis = createClient({
+  url: process.env.REDIS_URL ?? "redis://127.0.0.1:56379",
+});
+const cookieValue = (header: string[]) => header[0]?.split(";")[0] ?? "";
+
+describe("auth real PostgreSQL/Redis", () => {
+  let app: INestApplication;
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    assertSafeTestDatabaseUrl(process.env.DATABASE_URL ?? "");
+    await prisma.$connect();
+    await redis.connect();
+    const module = await Test.createTestingModule({
+      imports: [AppModule],
+    }).compile();
+    app = module.createNestApplication();
+    configureApp(app);
+    await app.init();
+  });
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await prisma.$executeRawUnsafe(`TRUNCATE TABLE "accounts" CASCADE`);
+    for (const key of await redis.keys("drift:auth:e2e:*"))
+      await redis.del(key);
+    delete process.env.SMS_SEND_LIMIT;
+    delete process.env.SMS_SEND_IP_LIMIT;
+    delete process.env.SMS_VERIFY_LIMIT;
+    delete process.env.SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS;
+    delete process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS;
+    delete process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
+  });
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await app?.close();
+    await redis.quit();
+    await prisma.$disconnect();
+  });
+  async function send() {
+    return request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId });
+  }
+  async function login() {
+    const sent = await send();
+    return request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: sent.body.data.debugCode });
+  }
+  it("sends, logs in with one-time code, stores encrypted identity, sets strict cookie, and guards me", async () => {
+    const sent = await send();
+    expect(sent.status).toBe(201);
+    expect(sent.body.data.debugCode).toMatch(/^\d{6}$/);
+    expect(JSON.stringify(sent.body)).not.toContain("13800138000");
+    const logged = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: sent.body.data.debugCode })
+      .expect(201);
+    const cookies = logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[];
+    expect(cookies[0]).toContain("HttpOnly");
+    expect(cookies[0]).toContain("SameSite=Strict");
+    expect(cookies[0]).toContain("Path=/api/v1/auth");
+    expect(cookies[0]).not.toContain("Secure");
+    expect(logged.body.data.accessToken).toEqual(expect.any(String));
+    const account = await prisma.account.findFirstOrThrow();
+    expect(Buffer.from(account.phoneCiphertext).toString()).not.toContain(
+      "13800138000",
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: sent.body.data.debugCode })
+      .expect(401);
+    const me = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${logged.body.data.accessToken}`)
+      .expect(200);
+    expect(me.body.data.accountId).toBe(account.id);
+  });
+  it("rejects wrong codes and enforces atomic rate limit with TTL", async () => {
+    await send();
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: "000000" })
+      .expect(401);
+    process.env.SMS_SEND_LIMIT = "1";
+    const oldKeys = await redis.keys("drift:auth:e2e:*");
+    for (const key of oldKeys) await redis.del(key);
+    await send();
+    const limited = await send();
+    expect(limited.status).toBe(429);
+    expect(limited.body.code).toBe("RATE_LIMITED");
+    const keys = await redis.keys("drift:auth:e2e:limit:send-phone:*");
+    expect(await redis.ttl(keys[0]!)).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+  it("omits debugCode in production", async () => {
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "production";
+    try {
+      const response = await send();
+      expect(response.body.data).not.toHaveProperty("debugCode");
+    } finally {
+      process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+    }
+  });
+  it("rotates refresh, detects old-token replay, and revokes the session", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const oldCookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    const refreshed = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", oldCookie)
+      .expect(200);
+    const nextCookie = cookieValue(
+      refreshed.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    expect(nextCookie).not.toBe(oldCookie);
+    const replay = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", oldCookie)
+      .expect(401);
+    expect(replay.body.code).toBe("AUTH_REFRESH_REUSED");
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", nextCookie)
+      .expect(401);
+    expect((await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow()).revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+  it("uses the first refresh cookie rather than allowing a duplicate to overwrite it", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const valid = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    const malicious = `${randomUUID()}.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA`;
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", `${valid}; refresh_token=${malicious}`)
+      .expect(200);
+
+    const second = await login();
+    const secondValid = cookieValue(
+      second.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", `refresh_token=${malicious}; ${secondValid}`)
+      .expect(401);
+  });
+  it("allows only one concurrent refresh and leaves the family revoked", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const cookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    const results = await Promise.all(
+      [1, 2].map(() =>
+        request(app.getHttpServer())
+          .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+          .set("Origin", origin)
+          .set("Cookie", cookie),
+      ),
+    );
+    expect(results.map((x) => x.status).sort()).toEqual([200, 401]);
+    const winner = results.find((result) => result.status === 200);
+    const winnerCookie = cookieValue(
+      winner?.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", winnerCookie)
+      .expect(401);
+    expect((await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow()).revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+  it("rejects tampered access and revoked/token-version sessions", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const token = logged.body.data.accessToken as string;
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}x`)
+      .expect(401);
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    await prisma.account.update({
+      where: { id: session.accountId },
+      data: { tokenVersion: { increment: 1 } },
+    });
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${token}`)
+      .expect(401);
+  });
+  it("requires exact Origin for refresh/logout and makes logout idempotent", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const cookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", "https://evil.example")
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(403);
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/logout")
+      .set("Origin", "https://evil.example")
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(403);
+    const first = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/logout")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(200);
+    expect((first.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[])[0]).toContain(
+      "refresh_token=",
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/logout")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(200);
+    expect((await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow()).revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("marks production cookies Secure and never stores access tokens in cookies", async () => {
+    const sent = await send();
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "production";
+    try {
+      const logged = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+        .send({ phone, deviceId, code: sent.body.data.debugCode })
+        .expect(201);
+      const cookies = logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[];
+      expect(cookies[0]).toContain("Secure");
+      expect(cookies.join(";")).not.toContain(logged.body.data.accessToken);
+      expect(cookies.join(";")).not.toContain("access_token=");
+    } finally {
+      process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("expires SMS codes and blocks verification at SMS_VERIFY_LIMIT", async () => {
+    process.env.SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS = "1";
+    const expired = await send();
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1100));
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: expired.body.data.debugCode })
+      .expect(401);
+    process.env.SMS_VERIFY_LIMIT = "2";
+    for (const key of await redis.keys("drift:auth:e2e:limit:verify-*"))
+      await redis.del(key);
+    await send();
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt += 1)
+      await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+        .send({ phone, deviceId, code: "000000" })
+        .expect(401);
+    const limited = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+      .send({ phone, deviceId, code: "000000" })
+      .expect(429);
+    expect(limited.body.code).toBe("RATE_LIMITED");
+  });
+
+  it("rejects actually expired access tokens", async () => {
+    process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS = "1";
+    const logged = await login();
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 1100));
+    const denied = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${logged.body.data.accessToken}`)
+      .expect(401);
+    expect(denied.body.code).toBe("AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED");
+  });
+
+  it("issues only minimum HS256 claims for the configured issuer and audience", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const [encodedHeader, encodedClaims] = (
+      logged.body.data.accessToken as string
+    ).split(".");
+    const header = JSON.parse(
+      Buffer.from(encodedHeader!, "base64url").toString(),
+    );
+    const claims = JSON.parse(
+      Buffer.from(encodedClaims!, "base64url").toString(),
+    );
+    expect(header).toEqual({ alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" });
+    expect(Object.keys(claims).sort()).toEqual([
+      "aud",
+      "device_id",
+      "exp",
+      "iat",
+      "iss",
+      "scopes",
+      "session_id",
+      "sub",
+      "token_version",
+    ]);
+    expect(claims).toMatchObject({
+      iss: "drift-api",
+      aud: "drift-web",
+      scopes: ["user"],
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("independently rejects a revoked session", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    await prisma.session.update({
+      where: { id: session.id },
+      data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
+    });
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${logged.body.data.accessToken}`)
+      .expect(401);
+  });
+
+  it("rejects a suspended account", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    await prisma.account.update({
+      where: { id: session.accountId },
+      data: { status: "SUSPENDED" },
+    });
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .get("/api/v1/me")
+      .set("Authorization", `Bearer ${logged.body.data.accessToken}`)
+      .expect(401);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    { phone: "not-a-phone", deviceId },
+    { phone, deviceId: "short" },
+    { phone, deviceId: "x".repeat(129) },
+    { phone, deviceId: "bad device!" },
+  ])("validates phone and deviceId DTO input %#", async (body) => {
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+      .send(body)
+      .expect(400);
+  });
+
+  it("uses Express trust proxy parsing as the real IP rate-limit dimension", async () => {
+    process.env.SMS_SEND_IP_LIMIT = "1";
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+      .set("X-Forwarded-For", "198.51.100.1")
+      .send({ phone: "13800138001", deviceId: "device-ip-001" })
+      .expect(201);
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+      .set("X-Forwarded-For", "198.51.100.2")
+      .send({ phone: "13800138002", deviceId: "device-ip-002" })
+      .expect(429);
+    for (const key of await redis.keys("drift:auth:e2e:*"))
+      await redis.del(key);
+    app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().set("trust proxy", 1);
+    try {
+      await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+        .set("X-Forwarded-For", "198.51.100.1")
+        .send({ phone: "13800138001", deviceId: "device-ip-001" })
+        .expect(201);
+      await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/send")
+        .set("X-Forwarded-For", "198.51.100.2")
+        .send({ phone: "13800138002", deviceId: "device-ip-002" })
+        .expect(201);
+    } finally {
+      app.getHttpAdapter().getInstance().set("trust proxy", false);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not log phone, code, JWT, refresh token, or Cookie", async () => {
+    const spies = (["log", "warn", "error", "debug", "verbose"] as const).map(
+      (method) =>
+        vi.spyOn(Logger.prototype, method).mockImplementation(() => undefined),
+    );
+    try {
+      const sent = await send();
+      const logged = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/sms/login")
+        .send({ phone, deviceId, code: sent.body.data.debugCode })
+        .expect(201);
+      const cookie = cookieValue(
+        logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+      );
+      await request(app.getHttpServer())
+        .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+        .set("Origin", origin)
+        .set("Cookie", cookie)
+        .expect(200);
+      const output = JSON.stringify(spies.flatMap((spy) => spy.mock.calls));
+      for (const secret of [
+        "13800138000",
+        sent.body.data.debugCode,
+        logged.body.data.accessToken,
+        cookie,
+      ])
+        expect(output).not.toContain(secret);
+      expect(output).not.toContain("refresh_token");
+    } finally {
+      for (const spy of spies) spy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not revoke a session for a random invalid refresh token", async () => {
+    await login();
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set(
+        "Cookie",
+        `other=1; refresh_token=${session.id}.AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA; tail=2`,
+      )
+      .expect(401);
+    expect(
+      (await prisma.session.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: session.id } }))
+        .revokedAt,
+    ).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("recovers Auth Redis after a connection deadline and closes its sockets", async () => {
+    const sockets = new Set<Socket>();
+    const server = createServer((socket) => {
+      sockets.add(socket);
+      socket.on("close", () => sockets.delete(socket));
+    });
+    await new Promise<void>((resolve) =>
+      server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve),
+    );
+    const address = server.address();
+    if (!address || typeof address === "string")
+      throw new Error("missing port");
+    const previousUrl = process.env.REDIS_URL;
+    const previousTimeout = process.env.REDIS_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_MS;
+    process.env.REDIS_URL = `redis://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`;
+    process.env.REDIS_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_MS = "500";
+    const service = new RedisService();
+    const failedClient = service.client;
+    let recoveredClient = failedClient;
+    try {
+      await expect(service.ensureConnected()).rejects.toThrow(/timed out/);
+      expect(failedClient.isOpen).toBe(false);
+      process.env.REDIS_URL = previousUrl ?? "redis://127.0.0.1:56379";
+      await expect(service.ensureConnected()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+      recoveredClient = service.client;
+      expect(recoveredClient).not.toBe(failedClient);
+      expect(recoveredClient.isReady).toBe(true);
+    } finally {
+      await service.onModuleDestroy();
+      expect(recoveredClient.isOpen).toBe(false);
+      for (const socket of sockets) socket.destroy();
+      await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) =>
+        server.close((error) => (error ? reject(error) : resolve())),
+      );
+      process.env.REDIS_URL = previousUrl;
+      process.env.REDIS_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_MS = previousTimeout;
+    }
+  });
+});

apps/api/src/auth/auth.guard.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+import {
+  CanActivate,
+  ExecutionContext,
+  HttpStatus,
+  Inject,
+  Injectable,
+} from "@nestjs/common";
+import { ErrorCode } from "@drift/contracts";
+import type { Request } from "express";
+import { DomainException } from "../common/domain.exception.js";
+import { PrismaService } from "../database/prisma.service.js";
+import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+import type { AuthenticatedRequest } from "./current-user.decorator.js";
+@Injectable()
+export class AuthGuard implements CanActivate {
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(PrismaService) private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
+    @Inject(TokenService) private readonly tokens: TokenService,
+  ) {}
+  async canActivate(ctx: ExecutionContext): Promise<boolean> {
+    const req = ctx.switchToHttp().getRequest<Request & AuthenticatedRequest>();
+    const auth = req.headers.authorization;
+    if (!auth?.startsWith("Bearer ")) throw this.denied();
+    const claims = this.tokens.verifyAccess(auth.slice(7));
+    const session = await this.prisma.session.findUnique({
+      where: { id: claims.session_id },
+      include: { account: true },
+    });
+    if (
+      !session ||
+      session.accountId !== claims.sub ||
+      session.deviceId !== claims.device_id ||
+      session.revokedAt ||
+      session.expiresAt <= new Date() ||
+      session.account.status !== "ACTIVE" ||
+      session.account.tokenVersion !== claims.token_version
+    )
+      throw this.denied();
+    req.user = claims;
+    return true;
+  }
+  private denied() {
+    return new DomainException(
+      ErrorCode.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED,
+      "Unauthorized",
+      HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+    );
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/auth/auth.module.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { AuthController } from "./auth.controller.js";
+import { AuthGuard } from "./auth.guard.js";
+import { AuthService } from "./auth.service.js";
+import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+import { DatabaseModule } from "../database/database.module.js";
+import { RedisModule } from "../redis/redis.module.js";
+@Module({
+  imports: [DatabaseModule, RedisModule],
+  controllers: [AuthController],
+  providers: [AuthService, TokenService, AuthGuard],
+  exports: [AuthGuard, TokenService],
+})
+export class AuthModule {}

apps/api/src/auth/auth.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+import { HttpStatus, Inject, Injectable } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { ErrorCode } from "@drift/contracts";
+import { Prisma, type Account } from "@prisma/client";
+import { randomInt, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { DomainException } from "../common/domain.exception.js";
+import { PrismaService } from "../database/prisma.service.js";
+import { RedisService } from "../redis/redis.service.js";
+import {
+  codeHmac,
+  encryptPhone,
+  envInt,
+  phoneHmac,
+  refreshHmac,
+  safeEqual,
+} from "./auth.config.js";
+import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+
+export interface TokenPair {
+  accessToken: string;
+  refreshToken: string;
+  expiresIn: number;
+}
+@Injectable()
+export class AuthService {
+  constructor(
+    @Inject(PrismaService) private readonly prisma: PrismaService,
+    @Inject(RedisService) private readonly redis: RedisService,
+    @Inject(TokenService) private readonly tokens: TokenService,
+  ) {}
+  normalizePhone(raw: string): string {
+    const compact = raw.replace(/[\s()-]/g, "");
+    const local = compact.startsWith("+86")
+      ? compact.slice(3)
+      : compact.startsWith("86") && compact.length === 13
+        ? compact.slice(2)
+        : compact;
+    if (!/^1[3-9]\d{9}$/.test(local))
+      throw new DomainException(
+        ErrorCode.AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS,
+        "Invalid credentials",
+        HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+      );
+    return `+86${local}`;
+  }
+  private prefix() {
+    return process.env.REDIS_KEY_PREFIX ?? "drift:auth:";
+  }
+  private async limit(
+    kind: string,
+    parts: string[],
+    max: number,
+    ttl: number,
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    await this.redis.ensureConnected();
+    const key = `${this.prefix()}limit:${kind}:${parts.join(":")}`;
+    const result = (await this.redis.client.eval(
+      `local n=redis.call('INCR',KEYS[1]); if n==1 then redis.call('EXPIRE',KEYS[1],ARGV[1]) end; return n`,
+      { keys: [key], arguments: [String(ttl)] },
+    )) as number;
+    if (result > max)
+      throw new DomainException(
+        ErrorCode.RATE_LIMITED,
+        "Too many requests",
+        HttpStatus.TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
+      );
+  }
+  async sendSms(
+    rawPhone: string,
+    deviceId: string,
+    ip: string,
+  ): Promise<{ sent: true; debugCode?: string }> {
+    const phone = this.normalizePhone(rawPhone);
+    const digest = phoneHmac(phone);
+    await Promise.all([
+      this.limit(
+        "send-phone",
+        [digest],
+        envInt("SMS_SEND_LIMIT", 3),
+        envInt("SMS_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 300),
+      ),
+      this.limit(
+        "send-device",
+        [deviceId],
+        envInt("SMS_SEND_DEVICE_LIMIT", 5),
+        envInt("SMS_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 300),
+      ),
+      this.limit(
+        "send-ip",
+        [phoneHmac(ip)],
+        envInt("SMS_SEND_IP_LIMIT", 10),
+        envInt("SMS_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 300),
+      ),
+    ]);
+    const code = randomInt(0, 1000000).toString().padStart(6, "0");
+    await this.redis.client.set(
+      `${this.prefix()}code:${digest}`,
+      codeHmac(digest, code),
+      { EX: envInt("SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS", 300) },
+    );
+    const result: { sent: true; debugCode?: string } = { sent: true };
+    if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") result.debugCode = code;
+    return result;
+  }
+  async login(
+    rawPhone: string,
+    code: string,
+    deviceId: string,
+    ip: string,
+  ): Promise<TokenPair> {
+    const phone = this.normalizePhone(rawPhone);
+    const digest = phoneHmac(phone);
+    await Promise.all([
+      this.limit(
+        "verify-phone",
+        [digest],
+        envInt("SMS_VERIFY_LIMIT", 5),
+        envInt("SMS_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 300),
+      ),
+      this.limit(
+        "verify-combined",
+        [digest, phoneHmac(ip), deviceId],
+        envInt("SMS_VERIFY_COMBINED_LIMIT", 5),
+        envInt("SMS_RATE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 300),
+      ),
+    ]);
+    const key = `${this.prefix()}code:${digest}`;
+    const consumed = await this.redis.client.eval(
+      `local v=redis.call('GET',KEYS[1]); if v and v==ARGV[1] then redis.call('DEL',KEYS[1]); return 1 end; return 0`,
+      { keys: [key], arguments: [codeHmac(digest, code)] },
+    );
+    if (Number(consumed) !== 1) throw this.invalid();
+    let account = await this.prisma.account.findUnique({
+      where: { phoneHmac: digest },
+    });
+    if (!account) account = await this.createAccount(phone, digest);
+    if (account.status !== "ACTIVE") throw this.invalid();
+    return this.createSession(account, deviceId);
+  }
+  private async createAccount(phone: string, digest: string): Promise<Account> {
+    try {
+      return await this.prisma.account.create({
+        data: {
+          phoneHmac: digest,
+          phoneCiphertext: new Uint8Array(encryptPhone(phone)),
+        },
+      });
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (
+        error instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError &&
+        error.code === "P2002"
+      ) {
+        const found = await this.prisma.account.findUnique({
+          where: { phoneHmac: digest },
+        });
+        if (found) return found;
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+  private async createSession(
+    account: Account,
+    deviceId: string,
+  ): Promise<TokenPair> {
+    const id = randomUUID();
+    const refresh = this.tokens.newRefresh(id);
+    const expiresAt = new Date(
+      Date.now() + envInt("REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS", 2592000) * 1000,
+    );
+    await this.prisma.session.create({
+      data: {
+        id,
+        accountId: account.id,
+        deviceId,
+        refreshTokenHash: refreshHmac(refresh),
+        tokenFamily: id,
+        expiresAt,
+      },
+    });
+    return this.pair(account, id, deviceId, refresh);
+  }
+  private pair(
+    account: Account,
+    sessionId: string,
+    deviceId: string,
+    refreshToken: string,
+  ): TokenPair {
+    const expiresIn = envInt("ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS", 900);
+    return {
+      accessToken: this.tokens.issueAccess({
+        sub: account.id,
+        session_id: sessionId,
+        device_id: deviceId,
+        scopes: ["user"],
+        token_version: account.tokenVersion,
+      }),
+      refreshToken,
+      expiresIn,
+    };
+  }
+  async refresh(token: string): Promise<TokenPair> {
+    const parsed = this.parseRefresh(token);
+    const hash = refreshHmac(token);
+    const observed = await this.prisma.session.findUnique({
+      where: { id: parsed },
+    });
+    if (
+      observed?.previousTokenHash &&
+      safeEqual(observed.previousTokenHash, hash)
+    )
+      return this.revokeReusedFamily(observed.tokenFamily);
+
+    try {
+      const result = await this.prisma.$transaction(
+        async (tx): Promise<TokenPair | { reusedFamily: string }> => {
+          const session = await tx.session.findUnique({
+            where: { id: parsed },
+            include: { account: true },
+          });
+          if (!session) throw this.invalid();
+          if (
+            session.previousTokenHash &&
+            safeEqual(session.previousTokenHash, hash)
+          )
+            return { reusedFamily: session.tokenFamily };
+          if (
+            !safeEqual(session.refreshTokenHash, hash) ||
+            session.revokedAt ||
+            session.expiresAt <= new Date() ||
+            session.account.status !== "ACTIVE"
+          )
+            throw this.invalid();
+          const next = this.tokens.newRefresh(session.id);
+          const changed = await tx.session.updateMany({
+            where: { id: session.id, refreshTokenHash: hash, revokedAt: null },
+            data: {
+              previousTokenHash: hash,
+              refreshTokenHash: refreshHmac(next),
+              generation: { increment: 1 },
+              rotatedAt: new Date(),
+            },
+          });
+          if (changed.count !== 1) return { reusedFamily: session.tokenFamily };
+          return this.pair(
+            session.account,
+            session.id,
+            session.deviceId ?? "",
+            next,
+          );
+        },
+        { isolationLevel: Prisma.TransactionIsolationLevel.Serializable },
+      );
+      if ("reusedFamily" in result)
+        return this.revokeReusedFamily(result.reusedFamily);
+      return result;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof DomainException) throw error;
+      if (
+        error instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError &&
+        error.code === "P2034"
+      ) {
+        const session = await this.prisma.session.findUnique({
+          where: { id: parsed },
+        });
+        if (
+          session?.previousTokenHash &&
+          safeEqual(session.previousTokenHash, hash)
+        )
+          return this.revokeReusedFamily(session.tokenFamily);
+      }
+      throw error;
+    }
+  }
+  private async revokeReusedFamily(family: string): Promise<never> {
+    await this.prisma.session.updateMany({
+      where: { tokenFamily: family },
+      data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
+    });
+    throw new DomainException(
+      ErrorCode.AUTH_REFRESH_REUSED,
+      "Refresh token reused",
+      HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+    );
+  }
+  async logout(token: string | undefined): Promise<void> {
+    if (!token) return;
+    let id: string;
+    try {
+      id = this.parseRefresh(token);
+    } catch {
+      return;
+    }
+    const hash = refreshHmac(token);
+    await this.prisma.session.updateMany({
+      where: {
+        id,
+        OR: [{ refreshTokenHash: hash }, { previousTokenHash: hash }],
+      },
+      data: { revokedAt: new Date() },
+    });
+  }
+  private parseRefresh(token: string): string {
+    const id = token.split(".")[0];
+    if (!id || !/^[0-9a-f-]{36}$/.test(id)) throw this.invalid();
+    return id;
+  }
+  private invalid() {
+    return new DomainException(
+      ErrorCode.AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS,
+      "Invalid credentials",
+      HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+    );
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/auth/current-user.decorator.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import { createParamDecorator, type ExecutionContext } from "@nestjs/common";
+import type { AccessClaims } from "./token.service.js";
+export interface AuthenticatedRequest {
+  user?: AccessClaims;
+}
+export const CurrentUser = createParamDecorator(
+  (_data: unknown, ctx: ExecutionContext) =>
+    ctx.switchToHttp().getRequest<AuthenticatedRequest>().user,
+);

apps/api/src/auth/dto.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+import {
+  IsPhoneNumber,
+  IsString,
+  Matches,
+  MaxLength,
+  MinLength,
+} from "class-validator";
+export class SendSmsDto {
+  @IsString() @MinLength(6) @MaxLength(32) @IsPhoneNumber("CN") phone!: string;
+  @IsString() @Matches(/^[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{8,128}$/) deviceId!: string;
+}
+export class LoginDto extends SendSmsDto {
+  @IsString() @Matches(/^\d{6}$/) code!: string;
+}

apps/api/src/auth/token.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+import { HttpStatus, Injectable } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { ErrorCode } from "@drift/contracts";
+import { createHmac, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
+import { DomainException } from "../common/domain.exception.js";
+import { envInt, jwtSecret } from "./auth.config.js";
+export interface AccessClaims {
+  sub: string;
+  session_id: string;
+  device_id: string;
+  scopes: string[];
+  token_version: number;
+  iss: string;
+  aud: string;
+  exp: number;
+  iat: number;
+}
+const b64 = (v: Buffer | string) => Buffer.from(v).toString("base64url");
+@Injectable()
+export class TokenService {
+  issueAccess(
+    input: Omit<AccessClaims, "iss" | "aud" | "exp" | "iat">,
+  ): string {
+    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const header = b64(JSON.stringify({ alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" }));
+    const body = b64(
+      JSON.stringify({
+        ...input,
+        iss: process.env.JWT_ISSUER ?? "drift-api",
+        aud: process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE ?? "drift-web",
+        iat: now,
+        exp: now + envInt("ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS", 900),
+      }),
+    );
+    const data = `${header}.${body}`;
+    return `${data}.${createHmac("sha256", jwtSecret()).update(data).digest("base64url")}`;
+  }
+  verifyAccess(token: string): AccessClaims {
+    try {
+      const parts = token.split(".");
+      if (parts.length !== 3) throw new Error();
+      const [h, p, s] = parts as [string, string, string];
+      const header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(h, "base64url").toString()) as {
+        alg?: string;
+      };
+      if (header.alg !== "HS256") throw new Error();
+      const expected = createHmac("sha256", jwtSecret())
+        .update(`${h}.${p}`)
+        .digest();
+      const actual = Buffer.from(s, "base64url");
+      if (
+        expected.length !== actual.length ||
+        !timingSafeEqual(expected, actual)
+      )
+        throw new Error();
+      const claims = JSON.parse(
+        Buffer.from(p, "base64url").toString(),
+      ) as AccessClaims;
+      if (
+        claims.iss !== (process.env.JWT_ISSUER ?? "drift-api") ||
+        claims.aud !== (process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE ?? "drift-web")
+      )
+        throw new Error();
+      if (claims.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000))
+        throw new DomainException(
+          ErrorCode.AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED,
+          "Access token expired",
+          HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+        );
+      return claims;
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (error instanceof DomainException) throw error;
+      throw new DomainException(
+        ErrorCode.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED,
+        "Unauthorized",
+        HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+  newRefresh(sessionId: string): string {
+    return `${sessionId}.${randomBytes(32).toString("base64url")}`;
+  }
+}

apps/api/src/database/database.module.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { PrismaService } from "./prisma.service.js";
+
+@Module({ providers: [PrismaService], exports: [PrismaService] })
+export class DatabaseModule {}

apps/api/src/main.ts

@@ -2,12 +2,20 @@ import "reflect-metadata";
 import { ValidationPipe, type INestApplication } from "@nestjs/common";
 import { NestFactory } from "@nestjs/core";
 import helmet from "helmet";
+import type { Application } from "express";
 import { AppModule } from "./app.module.js";
+import { validateAuthEnvironment } from "./auth/auth.config.js";
 import { HttpResponseInterceptor } from "./common/http-response.interceptor.js";
 import { DomainExceptionFilter } from "./common/domain-exception.filter.js";
 
 export function configureApp(app: INestApplication): void {
+  validateAuthEnvironment();
   const allowedOrigin = process.env.WEB_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000";
+  const adapter = app.getHttpAdapter?.() as
+    { getInstance(): Application } | undefined;
+  adapter
+    ?.getInstance()
+    .set("trust proxy", process.env.TRUST_PROXY === "true" ? 1 : false);
   app.setGlobalPrefix("api/v1");
   app.use(helmet());
   app.useGlobalPipes(
@@ -35,6 +43,7 @@ type AppFactory = () => Promise<INestApplication>;
 export async function bootstrap(
   appFactory: AppFactory = () => NestFactory.create(AppModule),
 ): Promise<void> {
+  validateAuthEnvironment();
   const app = await appFactory();
   configureApp(app);
   app.enableShutdownHooks();

apps/api/src/redis/redis.module.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { RedisService } from "./redis.service.js";
+@Module({ providers: [RedisService], exports: [RedisService] })
+export class RedisModule {}

apps/api/src/redis/redis.service.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+import {
+  Inject,
+  Injectable,
+  Logger,
+  Optional,
+  type OnModuleDestroy,
+  type OnModuleInit,
+} from "@nestjs/common";
+import { createClient } from "redis";
+
+type RedisClient = ReturnType<typeof createClient>;
+type RedisClientFactory = () => RedisClient;
+export const AUTH_REDIS_CLIENT_FACTORY = Symbol("AUTH_REDIS_CLIENT_FACTORY");
+
+@Injectable()
+export class RedisService implements OnModuleInit, OnModuleDestroy {
+  private readonly logger = new Logger(RedisService.name);
+  private readonly timeoutMs: number;
+  private current: RedisClient | undefined;
+  private generation = 0;
+  private readonly connections = new WeakMap<RedisClient, Promise<void>>();
+  private readonly destroyed = new WeakSet<RedisClient>();
+  private readonly loggedErrors = new WeakSet<RedisClient>();
+  private shuttingDown = false;
+
+  constructor(
+    @Optional()
+    @Inject(AUTH_REDIS_CLIENT_FACTORY)
+    private readonly factory?: RedisClientFactory,
+  ) {
+    const configured = Number(process.env.REDIS_OPERATION_TIMEOUT_MS ?? 1000);
+    this.timeoutMs =
+      Number.isFinite(configured) && configured > 0 ? configured : 1000;
+  }
+
+  get client(): RedisClient {
+    if (!this.current) {
+      if (this.shuttingDown) throw new Error("Auth Redis is shutting down");
+      const client = this.factory?.() ?? this.create();
+      client.on("error", () => {
+        if (this.loggedErrors.has(client)) return;
+        this.loggedErrors.add(client);
+        this.logger.warn({
+          event: "Auth Redis client error",
+          code: "REDIS_ERROR",
+        });
+      });
+      this.current = client;
+      this.generation += 1;
+    }
+    return this.current;
+  }
+
+  async ensureConnected(): Promise<void> {
+    if (this.shuttingDown) throw new Error("Auth Redis is shutting down");
+    const client = this.client;
+    const generation = this.generation;
+    if (client.isReady) return;
+    let pending = this.connections.get(client);
+    if (!pending) {
+      pending = this.withDeadline(client, generation, client.connect()).then(
+        () => undefined,
+      );
+      this.connections.set(client, pending);
+    }
+    try {
+      await pending;
+    } catch (error) {
+      this.destroyClient(client, generation);
+      throw error;
+    } finally {
+      if (this.connections.get(client) === pending)
+        this.connections.delete(client);
+    }
+  }
+
+  async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
+    /* Auth Redis connects lazily so unrelated modules remain isolated. */
+  }
+
+  async onModuleDestroy(): Promise<void> {
+    this.shuttingDown = true;
+    const client = this.current;
+    if (!client || !client.isOpen) return;
+    const generation = this.generation;
+    try {
+      await this.withDeadline(client, generation, client.quit());
+    } catch {
+      this.destroyClient(client, generation);
+    }
+  }
+
+  private create(): RedisClient {
+    return createClient({
+      url: process.env.REDIS_URL ?? "redis://127.0.0.1:6379",
+      socket: { connectTimeout: this.timeoutMs, reconnectStrategy: false },
+    });
+  }
+
+  private withDeadline<T>(
+    client: RedisClient,
+    generation: number,
+    operation: Promise<T>,
+  ): Promise<T> {
+    return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => {
+      const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        this.destroyClient(client, generation);
+        reject(new Error("Auth Redis operation timed out"));
+      }, this.timeoutMs);
+      void operation.then(
+        (value) => {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          resolve(value);
+        },
+        (error: unknown) => {
+          clearTimeout(timer);
+          reject(
+            error instanceof Error ? error : new Error("Auth Redis failed"),
+          );
+        },
+      );
+    });
+  }
+
+  private destroyClient(client: RedisClient, generation: number): void {
+    if (!this.destroyed.has(client)) {
+      this.destroyed.add(client);
+      try {
+        client.destroy();
+      } catch {
+        /* best-effort cleanup */
+      }
+    }
+    if (this.current === client && this.generation === generation)
+      this.current = undefined;
+  }
+}

apps/api/tsconfig.json

@@ -8,5 +8,6 @@
     "noEmit": true,
     "types": ["node", "vitest/globals"]
   },
-  "include": ["src/**/*.ts", "vitest.config.ts"]
+  "include": ["src/**/*.ts", "vitest.config.ts"],
+  "exclude": ["src/**/*spec.ts"]
 }

packages/contracts/src/index.test.ts

@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ describe("contracts", () => {
       "INTERNAL_ERROR",
       "AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED",
       "AUTH_REFRESH_REUSED",
+      "AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS",
+      "AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED",
+      "RATE_LIMITED",
+      "AUTH_ORIGIN_FORBIDDEN",
       "BOTTLE_DAILY_LIMIT",
       "BOTTLE_POOL_EMPTY",
       "BOTTLE_LEASE_EXPIRED",

packages/contracts/src/index.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ export enum ErrorCode {
   INTERNAL_ERROR = "INTERNAL_ERROR",
   AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED = "AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED",
   AUTH_REFRESH_REUSED = "AUTH_REFRESH_REUSED",
+  AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS = "AUTH_INVALID_CREDENTIALS",
+  AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED = "AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED",
+  RATE_LIMITED = "RATE_LIMITED",
+  AUTH_ORIGIN_FORBIDDEN = "AUTH_ORIGIN_FORBIDDEN",
   BOTTLE_DAILY_LIMIT = "BOTTLE_DAILY_LIMIT",
   BOTTLE_POOL_EMPTY = "BOTTLE_POOL_EMPTY",
   BOTTLE_LEASE_EXPIRED = "BOTTLE_LEASE_EXPIRED",

pnpm-lock.yaml

@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@ importers:
       class-validator:
         specifier: ^0.14.2
         version: 0.14.4
+      cookie:
+        specifier: 1.1.1
+        version: 1.1.1
       helmet:
         specifier: ^8.1.0
         version: 8.3.0
@@ -1076,6 +1079,13 @@ packages:
         integrity: sha512-HLFeCYgz89uk22N5Qg3dvGvsv46B8GLvKKo1zKG4NybA8U2DiEO3w9lqGg29t/tfLRJpJ6iQxnVw4OnB7MoM9g==,
       }
 
+  cookie@1.1.1:
+    resolution:
+      {
+        integrity: sha512-ei8Aos7ja0weRpFzJnEA9UHJ/7XQmqglbRwnf2ATjcB9Wq874VKH9kfjjirM6UhU2/E5fFYadylyhFldcqSidQ==,
+      }
+    engines: { node: ">=18" }
+
   "@types/chai@5.2.3":
     resolution:
       {
@@ -4002,6 +4012,8 @@ snapshots:
 
   cookie@0.7.2: {}
 
+  cookie@1.1.1: {}
+
   cookiejar@2.1.4: {}
 
   cors@2.8.6:

prisma/migrations/0002_auth_sessions/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "token_family" UUID;
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "generation" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "previous_token_hash" VARCHAR(255);
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "rotated_at" TIMESTAMPTZ(3);
+UPDATE "sessions" SET "token_family" = "id" WHERE "token_family" IS NULL;
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ALTER COLUMN "token_family" SET NOT NULL;
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX "sessions_previous_token_hash_key" ON "sessions"("previous_token_hash");
+CREATE INDEX "sessions_token_family_idx" ON "sessions"("token_family");

prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -148,17 +148,22 @@ model AuthIdentity {
 }
 
 model Session {
-  id               String    @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
+  id                String    @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
-  accountId        String    @map("account_id") @db.Uuid
+  accountId         String    @map("account_id") @db.Uuid
-  refreshTokenHash String    @unique @map("refresh_token_hash") @db.VarChar(255)
+  refreshTokenHash  String    @unique @map("refresh_token_hash") @db.VarChar(255)
-  deviceId         String?   @map("device_id") @db.VarChar(255)
+  deviceId          String?   @map("device_id") @db.VarChar(255)
-  expiresAt        DateTime  @map("expires_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  expiresAt         DateTime  @map("expires_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
-  revokedAt        DateTime? @map("revoked_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  revokedAt         DateTime? @map("revoked_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
-  createdAt        DateTime  @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  tokenFamily       String    @map("token_family") @db.Uuid
-  updatedAt        DateTime  @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  generation        Int       @default(0)
-  account          Account   @relation(fields: [accountId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
+  previousTokenHash String?   @unique @map("previous_token_hash") @db.VarChar(255)
+  rotatedAt         DateTime? @map("rotated_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  createdAt         DateTime  @default(now()) @map("created_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  updatedAt         DateTime  @updatedAt @map("updated_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)
+  account           Account   @relation(fields: [accountId], references: [id], onDelete: Cascade)
 
   @@index([accountId, expiresAt])
+  @@index([tokenFamily])
   @@map("sessions")
 }