fix: 加固认证撤销与运行配置

.env.example

@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
 # Copy this file to .env and replace test-only values for non-test environments.
+NODE_ENV=production
+DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED=false
 DATABASE_URL=postgresql://drift:drift_test_only@127.0.0.1:55432/drift_bottle_test?schema=public
 REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:56379
 WEB_ORIGIN=http://localhost:3000

apps/api/src/auth/auth.config.spec.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
 import {
   codeHmac,
+  demoSmsCodeEnabled,
   phoneHmac,
   resetAuthEnvironmentForTests,
   validateAuthEnvironment,
+  webOrigin,
 } from "./auth.config.js";
 
 const valid = {
@@ -12,6 +14,7 @@ const valid = {
   VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY: "code-hmac-key-that-is-at-least-32-bytes!",
   REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY: "refresh-key-that-is-at-least-thirty-two-bytes",
   JWT_SECRET: "jwt-secret-that-is-at-least-thirty-two-bytes",
+  WEB_ORIGIN: "http://localhost:3000",
 };
 
 describe("auth environment", () => {
@@ -54,4 +57,37 @@ describe("auth environment", () => {
     expect(phoneHmac("+8613800138000")).toBe(phoneDigest);
     expect(codeHmac(phoneDigest, "123456")).not.toBe(first);
   });
+
+  it("fails closed when WEB_ORIGIN is missing or is not one absolute HTTP origin", () => {
+    for (const value of [
+      undefined,
+      "localhost:3000",
+      "https://a.test/path",
+      "https://u:p@a.test",
+      "ftp://a.test",
+    ]) {
+      resetAuthEnvironmentForTests();
+      if (value === undefined) delete process.env.WEB_ORIGIN;
+      else process.env.WEB_ORIGIN = value;
+      expect(() => validateAuthEnvironment()).toThrow(/WEB_ORIGIN/);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("caches and exposes the validated web origin", () => {
+    validateAuthEnvironment();
+    expect(webOrigin()).toBe("http://localhost:3000");
+  });
+
+  it("returns demo codes only in test or explicitly enabled local development", () => {
+    delete process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED;
+    expect(demoSmsCodeEnabled()).toBe(false);
+    process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED = "true";
+    expect(demoSmsCodeEnabled()).toBe(true);
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "staging";
+    expect(demoSmsCodeEnabled()).toBe(false);
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "development";
+    expect(demoSmsCodeEnabled()).toBe(true);
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "production";
+    expect(demoSmsCodeEnabled()).toBe(false);
+  });
 });

apps/api/src/auth/auth.config.ts

@@ -26,6 +26,31 @@ const REQUIRED_KEYS = [
 ] as const;
 type AuthSecrets = Record<(typeof REQUIRED_KEYS)[number], Buffer>;
 let secrets: AuthSecrets | undefined;
+let configuredWebOrigin: string | undefined;
+
+function parseWebOrigin(): string {
+  const raw = process.env.WEB_ORIGIN;
+  if (!raw) throw new Error("WEB_ORIGIN is required");
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(raw);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("WEB_ORIGIN must be an absolute HTTP(S) origin");
+  }
+  if (
+    !["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol) ||
+    url.username ||
+    url.password ||
+    url.pathname !== "/" ||
+    url.search ||
+    url.hash ||
+    url.origin !== raw
+  )
+    throw new Error(
+      "WEB_ORIGIN must be one absolute HTTP(S) origin without credentials or path",
+    );
+  return url.origin;
+}
 
 export function validateAuthEnvironment(): void {
   const loaded = Object.fromEntries(
@@ -38,18 +63,35 @@ export function validateAuthEnvironment(): void {
   );
   if (new Set(fingerprints).size !== fingerprints.length)
     throw new Error("Auth secrets must be independent");
+  const origin = parseWebOrigin();
+  if (process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED === "true" && !demoEnvironmentAllowed())
+    throw new Error(
+      "DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED is forbidden outside test or local development",
+    );
   secrets = loaded;
+  configuredWebOrigin = origin;
 }
 export function resetAuthEnvironmentForTests(): void {
   if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "test")
     throw new Error("Auth environment reset is test-only");
   secrets = undefined;
+  configuredWebOrigin = undefined;
 }
 function authSecrets(): AuthSecrets {
   if (!secrets) validateAuthEnvironment();
   return secrets!;
 }
 export const jwtSecret = (): Buffer => authSecrets().JWT_SECRET;
+export const webOrigin = (): string => {
+  if (!configuredWebOrigin) validateAuthEnvironment();
+  return configuredWebOrigin!;
+};
+const demoEnvironmentAllowed = (): boolean =>
+  process.env.NODE_ENV === "test" ||
+  process.env.NODE_ENV === "development" ||
+  process.env.APP_ENV === "local";
+export const demoSmsCodeEnabled = (): boolean =>
+  process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED === "true" && demoEnvironmentAllowed();
 export const phoneHmac = (phone: string): string =>
   createHmac("sha256", authSecrets().PHONE_HMAC_KEY)
     .update(phone)

apps/api/src/auth/auth.controller.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import { AuthService, type TokenPair } from "./auth.service.js";
 import { CurrentUser } from "./current-user.decorator.js";
 import type { AccessClaims } from "./token.service.js";
 import { LoginDto, SendSmsDto } from "./dto.js";
+import { envInt, webOrigin } from "./auth.config.js";
 const COOKIE = "refresh_token";
 @Controller()
 export class AuthController {
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ export class AuthController {
     @Res({ passthrough: true }) res: Response,
   ) {
     this.origin(req);
-    const pair = await this.auth.refresh(this.readCookie(req));
+    const pair = await this.auth.refresh(this.readCookie(req), this.ip(req));
     this.cookie(res, pair.refreshToken);
     return this.publicPair(pair);
   }
@@ -91,12 +92,12 @@ export class AuthController {
       sameSite: "strict",
       secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
       path: "/api/v1/auth",
-      maxAge: Number(process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS ?? 2592000) * 1000,
+      maxAge: envInt("REFRESH_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS", 2592000) * 1000,
     });
   }
   private origin(req: Request) {
     const origin = req.headers.origin;
-    if (origin !== process.env.WEB_ORIGIN)
+    if (origin !== webOrigin())
       throw new DomainException(
         ErrorCode.AUTH_ORIGIN_FORBIDDEN,
         "Forbidden origin",

apps/api/src/auth/auth.e2e-spec.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ process.env.JWT_SECRET = "test-jwt-secret-with-at-least-thirty-two-bytes";
 process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY =
   "test-refresh-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
 process.env.REDIS_KEY_PREFIX = "drift:auth:e2e:";
+process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED = "true";
 const phone = "138 0013 8000",
   deviceId = "device-test-001",
   origin = "http://localhost:3000";
@@ -67,6 +68,8 @@ describe("auth real PostgreSQL/Redis", () => {
     delete process.env.SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS;
     delete process.env.ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS;
     delete process.env.TRUST_PROXY;
+    delete process.env.REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT;
+    process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED = "true";
   });
   afterAll(async () => {
     await app?.close();
@@ -172,6 +175,18 @@ describe("auth real PostgreSQL/Redis", () => {
       process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
     }
   });
+  it("omits debugCode by default and never leaks it in staging", async () => {
+    delete process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED;
+    expect((await send()).body.data).not.toHaveProperty("debugCode");
+    process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED = "true";
+    process.env.NODE_ENV = "staging";
+    try {
+      expect((await send()).body.data).not.toHaveProperty("debugCode");
+    } finally {
+      process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+      process.env.DEMO_SMS_CODE_ENABLED = "true";
+    }
+  });
   it("rotates refresh, detects old-token replay, and revokes the session", async () => {
     const logged = await login();
     const oldCookie = cookieValue(
@@ -285,6 +300,76 @@ describe("auth real PostgreSQL/Redis", () => {
       .expect(401);
     expect((await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow()).revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
   });
+  it("revokes the family when account tokenVersion changes before refresh", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const cookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    expect(session.tokenVersion).toBe(0);
+    await prisma.account.update({
+      where: { id: session.accountId },
+      data: { tokenVersion: { increment: 1 } },
+    });
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(401);
+    expect(
+      (await prisma.session.findUniqueOrThrow({ where: { id: session.id } }))
+        .revokedAt,
+    ).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("deletes expired refresh history but retains unexpired history", async () => {
+    const logged = await login();
+    const session = await prisma.session.findFirstOrThrow();
+    await prisma.refreshToken.create({
+      data: {
+        tokenHash: "a".repeat(64),
+        sessionId: session.id,
+        generation: 99,
+        expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() - 1000),
+      },
+    });
+    const cookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(200);
+    expect(
+      await prisma.refreshToken.findUnique({
+        where: { tokenHash: "a".repeat(64) },
+      }),
+    ).toBeNull();
+    expect(
+      await prisma.refreshToken.count({ where: { sessionId: session.id } }),
+    ).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+  });
+
+  it("rate limits refresh by hashed token/session and IP", async () => {
+    process.env.REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT = "1";
+    const logged = await login();
+    const cookie = cookieValue(
+      logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
+    );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(200);
+    const limited = await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Origin", origin)
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(429);
+    expect(limited.body.code).toBe("RATE_LIMITED");
+  });
+
   it("rejects tampered access and revoked/token-version sessions", async () => {
     const logged = await login();
     const token = logged.body.data.accessToken as string;
@@ -307,6 +392,14 @@ describe("auth real PostgreSQL/Redis", () => {
     const cookie = cookieValue(
       logged.headers["set-cookie"] as unknown as string[],
     );
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(403);
+    await request(app.getHttpServer())
+      .post("/api/v1/auth/logout")
+      .set("Cookie", cookie)
+      .expect(403);
     await request(app.getHttpServer())
       .post("/api/v1/auth/token/refresh")
       .set("Origin", "https://evil.example")

apps/api/src/auth/auth.guard.ts

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ export class AuthGuard implements CanActivate {
       session.revokedAt ||
       session.expiresAt <= new Date() ||
       session.account.status !== "ACTIVE" ||
+      session.tokenVersion !== claims.token_version ||
       session.account.tokenVersion !== claims.token_version
     )
       throw this.denied();

apps/api/src/auth/auth.service.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { PrismaService } from "../database/prisma.service.js";
 import { RedisService } from "../redis/redis.service.js";
 import {
   codeHmac,
+  demoSmsCodeEnabled,
   encryptPhone,
   envInt,
   phoneHmac,
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ export class AuthService {
       { EX: envInt("SMS_CODE_TTL_SECONDS", 300) },
     );
     const result: { sent: true; debugCode?: string } = { sent: true };
-    if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production") result.debugCode = code;
+    if (demoSmsCodeEnabled()) result.debugCode = code;
     return result;
   }
   async login(
@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ export class AuthService {
       data: {
         id,
         accountId: account.id,
+        tokenVersion: account.tokenVersion,
         deviceId,
         refreshTokenHash: refreshHmac(refresh),
         tokenFamily: id,
@@ -213,7 +215,11 @@ export class AuthService {
       expiresIn,
     };
   }
-  async refresh(token: string): Promise<TokenPair> {
+  async refresh(
+    token: string,
+    ip: string,
+    retryAttempt = 0,
+  ): Promise<TokenPair> {
     if (!this.validRefreshShape(token)) throw this.invalid();
     const hash = refreshHmac(token);
     const observed = await this.prisma.refreshToken.findUnique({
@@ -221,6 +227,29 @@ export class AuthService {
       include: { session: true },
     });
     if (!observed) throw this.invalid();
+    if (retryAttempt === 0) {
+      await this.limitAll([
+        {
+          kind: "refresh-token",
+          parts: [hash],
+          max: envInt("REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT", 60),
+          ttl: 60,
+        },
+        {
+          kind: "refresh-session",
+          parts: [observed.sessionId],
+          max: envInt("REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT", 60),
+          ttl: 60,
+        },
+        {
+          kind: "refresh-ip",
+          parts: [phoneHmac(ip)],
+          max: envInt("REFRESH_RATE_LIMIT", 60),
+          ttl: 60,
+        },
+      ]);
+      await this.cleanupExpiredRefreshTokens(observed.sessionId);
+    }
     if (observed.status === "USED")
       return this.revokeReusedFamily(observed.session.tokenFamily);
 
@@ -235,6 +264,8 @@ export class AuthService {
           if (stored.status === "USED")
             return { reusedFamily: stored.session.tokenFamily };
           const session = stored.session;
+          if (session.tokenVersion !== session.account.tokenVersion)
+            return { reusedFamily: session.tokenFamily };
           if (
             session.revokedAt ||
             session.expiresAt <= new Date() ||
@@ -285,23 +316,36 @@ export class AuthService {
         error instanceof Prisma.PrismaClientKnownRequestError &&
         (error.code === "P2034" || error.code === "P2002")
       ) {
-        // A serialization/uniqueness loser can observe the winner only after its
+        if (retryAttempt < 3) {
-        // transaction commits. Poll briefly, then revoke outside the failed tx.
+          await new Promise((resolve) =>
-        for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt += 1) {
+            setTimeout(resolve, 10 * 2 ** retryAttempt),
+          );
+          return this.refresh(token, ip, retryAttempt + 1);
+        }
         const raced = await this.prisma.refreshToken.findUnique({
           where: { tokenHash: hash },
           include: { session: true },
         });
         if (raced?.status === "USED")
           return this.revokeReusedFamily(raced.session.tokenFamily);
-          await new Promise((resolve) =>
+        throw new DomainException(
-            setTimeout(resolve, 10 * (attempt + 1)),
+          ErrorCode.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+          "Authentication temporarily unavailable",
+          HttpStatus.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
         );
       }
-      }
       throw error;
     }
   }
+  async cleanupExpiredRefreshTokens(sessionId?: string): Promise<number> {
+    const deleted = await this.prisma.refreshToken.deleteMany({
+      where: {
+        expiresAt: { lt: new Date() },
+        ...(sessionId ? { sessionId } : {}),
+      },
+    });
+    return deleted.count;
+  }
   private async revokeReusedFamily(family: string): Promise<never> {
     await this.prisma.session.updateMany({
       where: { tokenFamily: family },

apps/api/src/auth/token.service.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+import { createHmac, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
+import { beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import { TokenService } from "./token.service.js";
+
+process.env.NODE_ENV = "test";
+process.env.WEB_ORIGIN = "http://localhost:3000";
+process.env.PHONE_ENCRYPTION_KEY =
+  "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=";
+process.env.PHONE_HMAC_KEY = "token-phone-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
+process.env.VERIFICATION_CODE_HMAC_KEY =
+  "token-code-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes!";
+process.env.REFRESH_TOKEN_HMAC_KEY =
+  "token-refresh-hmac-key-with-at-least-32-bytes";
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = "token-jwt-secret-with-at-least-thirty-two-bytes";
+
+const secret = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
+const service = new TokenService();
+const base = () => ({
+  sub: randomUUID(),
+  session_id: randomUUID(),
+  device_id: "device-test-001",
+  scopes: ["user"],
+  token_version: 0,
+  iss: "drift-api",
+  aud: "drift-web",
+  iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
+  exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 60,
+});
+const sign = (header: unknown, claims: unknown) => {
+  const h = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(header)).toString("base64url");
+  const p = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(claims)).toString("base64url");
+  const data = `${h}.${p}`;
+  return `${data}.${createHmac("sha256", secret).update(data).digest("base64url")}`;
+};
+
+describe("strict access JWT verification", () => {
+  beforeAll(() =>
+    expect(
+      service.verifyAccess(sign({ alg: "HS256", typ: "JWT" }, base())),
+    ).toMatchObject({ scopes: ["user"] }),
+  );
+
+  it.each([
+    ["wrong typ", { typ: "JOSE", alg: "HS256" }, base()],
+    ["array payload", { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" }, []],
+    ["bad sub", { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" }, { ...base(), sub: "bad" }],
+    [
+      "bad session",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), session_id: "bad" },
+    ],
+    [
+      "bad device",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), device_id: "bad device!" },
+    ],
+    [
+      "unknown scope",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), scopes: ["admin"] },
+    ],
+    [
+      "negative version",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), token_version: -1 },
+    ],
+    [
+      "fractional exp",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), exp: Date.now() / 1000 + 60.5 },
+    ],
+    [
+      "future iat",
+      { typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" },
+      { ...base(), iat: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) + 301 },
+    ],
+  ])("rejects signed malformed claims: %s", (_name, header, claims) => {
+    expect(() => service.verifyAccess(sign(header, claims))).toThrowError(
+      /Unauthorized/,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each(["=", "+", "/", "!"])(
+    "rejects non-base64url or padded segments containing %s",
+    (bad) => {
+      const token = sign({ typ: "JWT", alg: "HS256" }, base());
+      const parts = token.split(".");
+      parts[0] += bad;
+      expect(() => service.verifyAccess(parts.join("."))).toThrowError(
+        /Unauthorized/,
+      );
+    },
+  );
+});

apps/api/src/auth/token.service.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,21 @@ export interface AccessClaims {
   iat: number;
 }
 const b64 = (v: Buffer | string) => Buffer.from(v).toString("base64url");
+const BASE64URL = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
+const UUID =
+  /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+const DEVICE_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,128}$/;
+const decodeCanonical = (value: string): Buffer => {
+  if (!BASE64URL.test(value)) throw new Error();
+  const decoded = Buffer.from(value, "base64url");
+  if (decoded.toString("base64url") !== value) throw new Error();
+  return decoded;
+};
+const plainObject = (value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> =>
+  typeof value === "object" &&
+  value !== null &&
+  !Array.isArray(value) &&
+  Object.getPrototypeOf(value) === Object.prototype;
 @Injectable()
 export class TokenService {
   issueAccess(
@@ -39,28 +54,48 @@ export class TokenService {
       const parts = token.split(".");
       if (parts.length !== 3) throw new Error();
       const [h, p, s] = parts as [string, string, string];
-      const header = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(h, "base64url").toString()) as {
+      const header: unknown = JSON.parse(decodeCanonical(h).toString());
-        alg?: string;
+      if (
-      };
+        !plainObject(header) ||
-      if (header.alg !== "HS256") throw new Error();
+        header.alg !== "HS256" ||
+        header.typ !== "JWT" ||
+        Object.keys(header).length !== 2
+      )
+        throw new Error();
       const expected = createHmac("sha256", jwtSecret())
         .update(`${h}.${p}`)
         .digest();
-      const actual = Buffer.from(s, "base64url");
+      const actual = decodeCanonical(s);
       if (
         expected.length !== actual.length ||
         !timingSafeEqual(expected, actual)
       )
         throw new Error();
-      const claims = JSON.parse(
+      const decodedClaims: unknown = JSON.parse(decodeCanonical(p).toString());
-        Buffer.from(p, "base64url").toString(),
+      if (!plainObject(decodedClaims)) throw new Error();
-      ) as AccessClaims;
+      const claims = decodedClaims as unknown as AccessClaims;
+      const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
       if (
+        Object.keys(claims).length !== 9 ||
+        !UUID.test(claims.sub) ||
+        !UUID.test(claims.session_id) ||
+        !DEVICE_ID.test(claims.device_id) ||
+        !Array.isArray(claims.scopes) ||
+        claims.scopes.length !== 1 ||
+        claims.scopes[0] !== "user" ||
+        !Number.isInteger(claims.token_version) ||
+        claims.token_version < 0 ||
+        !Number.isFinite(claims.iat) ||
+        !Number.isInteger(claims.iat) ||
+        !Number.isFinite(claims.exp) ||
+        !Number.isInteger(claims.exp) ||
+        claims.iat > now + 300 ||
+        claims.exp <= claims.iat ||
         claims.iss !== (process.env.JWT_ISSUER ?? "drift-api") ||
         claims.aud !== (process.env.JWT_AUDIENCE ?? "drift-web")
       )
         throw new Error();
-      if (claims.exp <= Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000))
+      if (claims.exp <= now)
         throw new DomainException(
           ErrorCode.AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED,
           "Access token expired",

apps/api/src/main.ts

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ import { NestFactory } from "@nestjs/core";
 import helmet from "helmet";
 import type { Application } from "express";
 import { AppModule } from "./app.module.js";
-import { validateAuthEnvironment } from "./auth/auth.config.js";
+import { validateAuthEnvironment, webOrigin } from "./auth/auth.config.js";
 import { HttpResponseInterceptor } from "./common/http-response.interceptor.js";
 import { DomainExceptionFilter } from "./common/domain-exception.filter.js";
 
 export function configureApp(app: INestApplication): void {
   validateAuthEnvironment();
-  const allowedOrigin = process.env.WEB_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000";
+  const allowedOrigin = webOrigin();
   const adapter = app.getHttpAdapter?.() as
     { getInstance(): Application } | undefined;
   adapter

prisma/migrations/0004_session_token_version/migration.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD COLUMN "token_version" INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
+
+UPDATE "sessions" AS s
+SET "token_version" = a."token_version"
+FROM "accounts" AS a
+WHERE s."account_id" = a."id";
+
+ALTER TABLE "sessions" ADD CONSTRAINT "sessions_token_version_nonnegative"
+  CHECK ("token_version" >= 0);

prisma/schema.prisma

@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ model AuthIdentity {
 model Session {
   id                String         @id @default(uuid()) @db.Uuid
   accountId         String         @map("account_id") @db.Uuid
+  tokenVersion      Int            @default(0) @map("token_version")
   refreshTokenHash  String         @unique @map("refresh_token_hash") @db.VarChar(255)
   deviceId          String?        @map("device_id") @db.VarChar(255)
   expiresAt         DateTime       @map("expires_at") @db.Timestamptz(3)

tests/integration/database.spec.ts

@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ describe("database authority constraints", () => {
     ).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  it("backfills and requires the session token version snapshot", async () => {
+    const columns = await prisma.$queryRaw<
+      Array<{ is_nullable: string; column_default: string | null }>
+    >`
+      SELECT is_nullable, column_default FROM information_schema.columns
+      WHERE table_schema = 'public' AND table_name = 'sessions' AND column_name = 'token_version'`;
+    expect(columns).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(columns[0]).toMatchObject({
+      is_nullable: "NO",
+      column_default: "0",
+    });
+  });
+
   it("expresses independent moderation and pool lifecycle state", async () => {
     const author = await createAccount("states");
     const bottle = await prisma.bottle.create({